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Transmission of organisms within the hospital setting has
become a topic of major concern not only for patients and
healthcare facilities but also for government agencies and the
general public. This increased awareness has occurred in part due
to the spread of organisms that have limited treatment options,
such as carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), as well as
the heightened recognition that many hospital-associated infec-
tions (HAIs) are preventable. A large body of literature shows
that horizontal transmission of multidrug-resistant organisms
involves the hands, and potentially the attire, of healthcare
workers (HCWs). This evidence provides the rationale for the use
of standard and contact isolation precautions among HCWs.
However, the health risks to visitors and the role of visitors in the
horizontal transmission of pathogens within acute care hospitals
is not as clearly defined. Consequently, uncertainty remains
regarding which precautions visitors should take when interact-
ing with patients placed on isolation precautions. Frequent
arguments against the use of isolation precautions among visitors
include lack of visitor movement between patient rooms, the
difficulty of educating visitors, and the difficulty of enforcing
compliance with isolation practices.
This manuscript was created to provide general recom-
mendations for isolation precautions among visitors based
on the literature and a survey of the Society for Healthcare
Epidemiology of America (SHEA) membership and SHEA
Research Network (SRN). For endemic situations with
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and
vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), we recommend not
using contact isolation precautions, although visitors inter-
acting with multiple patients should use isolation practices
similar to those of HCWs. Utilization of contact precautions
should be considered for visitors to patients with extensively
drug-resistant Gram-negative organisms (eg, Klebsiella
pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) or enteric pathogens with
diarrhea, such as Clostridium difficile and norovirus). Visitors
with extensive documented exposure to the symptomatic
patient prior to hospitalization such as parents/guardians/
family members may be excluded from isolation precautions.
These recommendations should be adapted to patient popu-
lations and individual hospital needs.
intended use
This document is intended to help healthcare facilities develop
or modify policies related to the use of isolation precautions by
visitors. The contents of the literature review and the survey
contain information pertaining predominantly to adult and
pediatric acute care hospitals. However, personnel in other
care settings may find the recommendations useful as they
consider this issue.
shea writing group
The writing group consists of volunteers among SHEA mem-
bers, most being current or past members of the SHEA
Guidelines Committee. Additionally, all authors are involved
at their respective organizations in the development of policies
pertaining to isolation precautions.
key areas addressed
Using a combination of a literature review and a survey, we
aimed to do the following:
1. Summarize the evidence for the role of visitors on the
horizontal transmission of pathogenic organisms within the
hospital setting, including outbreak situations.
2. Evaluate the scientific literature supporting the use of
contact or respiratory (droplet or airborne) isolation
precautions, including hand hygiene, among visitors.
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3. Characterize the current infection prevention practices
used for visitors as per a survey conducted among SHEA
members.
guidance and recommendation format
This topic lacks the level of evidence required for a more formal
guideline using a Grading of Recommendations Assessment,
Development and Evaluation (GRADE) system.1 Therefore,
no grading of the evidence level is provided for individual
recommendations. The guidance statement is based on
synthesis of limited evidence, theoretical rationale, practical
considerations, a survey of SHEA membership and the SHEA
Research Network, author opinion, and the consideration of
potential harm, where applicable.
guidance statement
The following expert recommendations attempt to balance
visitor and patient safety, the potential for the spread of
pathogens within the hospital, the psychosocial implications of
isolation practices, and the feasibility of enforcement of isola-
tion precautions among visitors. The recommendations that
follow are intended for endemic pathogens in nonoutbreak
situations for which contact isolation measures are often used
for healthcare providers (ie, MRSA and VRE). In outbreaks
or situations of increased transmission, practices involving
hospital visitation should be considered on a situational basis.
Although these recommendations are primarily intended for
acute care facilities, similar considerations may apply to other
healthcare settings (eg, post-acute care).
As the SHEA working group for isolation precautions for
visitors in acute care hospitals, we recommend the following:
I. Given the limited scientific evidence on the subject, studies
designed to evaluate the role of visitors in the horizontal
transmission of pathogens should be performed.
II. Until the appropriate studies are performed, the use of
isolation precautions among visitors should be guided by
the specific pathogen, the underlying infectious condition,
and the endemicity of the organism in both the hospital
and the surrounding community.
A. All visitors should perform hand hygiene prior to entering
a patient room and immediately after leaving the room.
Both hand washing with soap and water and proper use of
an alcohol-based hand rub are acceptable means of hand
hygiene. Institutions should ensure that sinks and alcohol-
based hand rub stations are easily accessible to visitors. Visitors
should be educated on the importance of frequent hand
hygiene in the hospital setting and on the available options and
proper techniques for performing hand hygiene.2
Rationale: Hand hygiene is a well-established means of redu-
cing the microbial burden on hands and preventing pathogen
transmission. In the healthcare setting hand hygiene can
prevent the spread of microorganisms between patients and
visitors. Promoting hand hygiene through use of visual cues
and reminders and ensuring that sinks and alcohol-based
hand rub stations are readily accessible can lead to increased
rates of adherence among hospital visitors.
B. For endemic situations with MRSA and VRE we recom-
mend not using contact isolation precautions for visitors in
routine circumstances.
Rationale: In many areas, MRSA and VRE are prevalent in
the community and limiting the contact of visitors is
probably not an effective intervention. However, we
suggest special consideration (eg, limiting or precluding
visitation, use of gowns/gloves) for certain types of visitors,
such as severely immunosuppressed individuals or those
who are unable to practice good hand hygiene.
C. If visitors to patients with MRSA or VRE will be interacting
with multiple patients, they may be at greater risk for
transmitting pathogens between patients and should use
isolation practices in a fashion similar to that of healthcare
workers (HCWs). This might be the case for visitors of
patients with long inpatient stays, such as after transplanta-
tion, in which multiple families and patients might have
more frequent and closer interactions with each other.
D. Utilization of contact precautions should be considered for
visitors to patients either colonized or infected with extensively
drug-resistant Gram-negative organisms (eg, KPC).
Rationale: In most regions of the United States, these highly
resistant pathogens are not widely prevalent in the community
and compliancewith contact precautionsmight protect visitors
during these exposures. Additionally, this intervention might
limit the spread of organisms in the hospital.
E. For visitors of patients infected with enteric pathogens (eg,
C. difficile, norovirus), we suggest the use of contact
isolation precautions.3
Rationale: The prevalence of some of these pathogens in the
community is either unknown or thought to be low; acquisi-
tion of these pathogens can be potentially harmful to visitors.
F. For parents/guardians/visitors with extended stay in a
patient’s room, including overnight visitation, isolation
precautions may not be practical. The risk of infection for
parents/guardians/visitors is likely reduced if they practice
good hand hygiene, and any additional benefit of wearing
gowns and gloves in these scenarios of prolonged exposure
is unclear.
In special situations, in which patients acquire new
transmissible infections after admission to the hospital,
protection of parent/guardian/visitor by the use of isolation
precautions may be considered. Examples of such scenarios
could include parents of children with hospital onset of
C. difficile infection or colonization/infection with exten-
sively antibiotic-resistant Gram-negative bacilli (eg, KPC).
If parents or other visitors are assisting HCWs with providing
care, standard precautions should be utilized, including the
use of gowns and gloves, if contact with blood, body fluids,
or nonintact skin is anticipated.
Rationale: The added benefit of contact isolation must be
weighed against logistical barriers to the prolonged use of
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isolation gear. Individualized considerations should be
undertaken for visitors that may be spending extended time
with their hospitalized child, including sleeping and eating
in the room.
G. For visitors to rooms of patients on droplet precautions, we
suggest the use of surgical masks. However, visitors with
extensive documented exposure to the symptomatic
patient prior to hospitalization such as parents/guardians/
family members may be excluded from these precautions;
they may either be immune to the infectious agent or
already in the incubation period. Among pediatric patients,
further considerations should include interference with
bonding. Isolation requirements should be considered on a
case-by-case basis in some circumstances (eg, highly viru-
lent pathogen). Additionally, healthcare facilities should
generally restrict visitation by any ill individual or family
member (eg, active cough, fever).
H. For visitors to patients on airborne precautions, we
recommend the use of surgical masks. An alternative is
an N95 respirator; however, this equipment is best used
with training and fit testing. Visitors with extensive
documented exposure to the symptomatic patient prior
to hospitalization, such as household contacts, may be
excluded from these precautions as they may be either
immune to the infectious agent or already in the
incubation period. In those instances in which prior
extensive exposure is not documented and N-95 or higher
respiratory protection is recommended for the patient,
consideration should be given to limiting visitation for
those who have not been fit tested. In these instances,
education of visitors is important and facilities should
clearly document these communications. As previously
noted in the recommendations for droplet precautions,
further considerations should include interference with
bonding. As stated previously, hospitals should consider
restricting entry of visitors that are symptomatic (eg, active
cough, fever).
Rationale: Pathogens that spread by either droplet or
airborne pathways should generally be considered poten-
tially harmful to visitors. As discussed in the ensuing text,
this is one of the few scenarios in which visitors have been
proven to spread organisms within the hospital setting.
With regard to airborne isolation, the use of N95
respirators among unfitted visitors is not warranted. If a
visitor is considered at risk of an airborne pathogen and
lacks previous exposure, then consideration should be
given to limiting entrance. Again, visitor education and
medico-legal considerations should be considered and
documented in the record.
I. In situations in which heightened horizontal transmission
is detected (eg, outbreak or increased baseline rates)
or a novel, potentially virulent pathogen is suspected or
identified (eg, Ebola virus, Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus [MERS-coV], severe acute respiratory
syndrome [SARS], etc.), enforcing isolation precautions
among visitors (including parents/guardians/siblings)
should be prioritized. Hospitals should consider restrict-
ing nonessential visitors, limiting the number of visitors at
one time, as well as developing policies and infrastructure
to monitor and enforce adherence to appropriate isolation
precautions among visitors in these circumstances.
Rationale: Horizontal transmission of pathogens within
the hospital usually occurs via vectors (eg, HCWs) or
vehicles (eg, contaminated surfaces, contaminated air). In
situations in which there is an increase in clonal
transmission of organisms or a novel and virulent
organism has been identified, enforcement of isolation
precautions among visitors is frequently used as one of
the interventions within an infection control bundle.
Additionally, alternative methods of communication
between visitors and patients (eg, video conferencing)
should be explored.
III. These recommendations should be adapted to individual
hospital needs and patient populations. Additionally,
hospitals should only consider writing policies regarding
visitors when they can be realistically enforced and
regularly evaluated for compliance. Resources should be
allocated to hospital infection prevention programs to
develop infrastructure to scale up visitor-related infection
control policy enforcement in settings of heightened
horizontal transmission.
methods
Between the months of February and June 2014 we searched
the PubMed/MEDLINE database for articles pertaining to
visitors and infection prevention in healthcare settings. The
literature review was limited to articles and reports published
in English, and following an initial search, we focused on
studies involving visitors and contact precautions, respiratory
precautions, and hand hygiene. We also searched for articles
reporting situations in which visitors may have been involved
in HAIs or transmission. An independent search was per-
formed to identify published studies focusing on visitors and
infection control among pediatric patient populations.
Additionally, during the months of April to June 2014, a
survey was sent to SHEA membership and SHEA Research
Network members to investigate infection control practices
related to visitors at their respective institutions.
results
Literature Review (Table 1)
No published studies have evaluated the impact of visitor
adherence with contact precautions in reducing the spread of
multidrug-resistant organisms. Although visitors spend more
time in patient rooms than do HCWs,4 the extent of contact
between visitors and patients likely varies. A survey of hospital
visitors suggests that most visitors understand the purpose of
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table 1. Summary of literature review on Isolation Precautions for Visitors
Year Lead Author Methodology Findings
2002 Afif et al6 Observational study (n= 65 visitors) on a
medical unit. Only visitors to patients with
MRSA colonization or infection were
included
Compliance with MRSA precautions defined as compliance
with glove, gown, and hand hygiene measures.
Compliance with MRSA precautions among visitors was
11%, the second lowest among 6 groups studied.
2004 Beck et al20 Review of procedures for SARS Outlined tips for facilitating compliance with respiratory
isolation
2012 Birnbach et al11 Observational study comparing 3
interventions: a sign mandating all visitors to
use hand gel, a free-standing hand gel
dispenser directly in front of a security desk,
and a combination of a freestanding hand gel
dispenser and a sign
Hand hygiene compliance was 52% at baseline and did not
improve significantly when the desk sign was provided as a
cue. Compliance improved with use of the freestanding
hand gel dispenser and the sign and dispenser
combination. The degree of improvement with the sign
and dispenser combination over the dispenser was not
statistically significant.
1995 Christie et al19 Overview of measures to stop a pertussis
outbreak in 1 facility
Procedures for visitors included wearing surgical masks,
restricted access for <14 years of age, preventing visitation
to neonatal unit except for parents, grandparents or
guardians, and creating a temporary child care service
2010 Clock et al7 Observational cohort study (n= 156 visitor
observations) at 3 sites within a single
hospital network
Prior to entering rooms of patients on contact precautions
adherence among visitors was hand hygiene (10.8%),
gloves (46.9%), gown (63%). After room exit adherence
among visitors were hand hygiene (9.7%), gloves (52.4%),
and gown (57.9%).
2012 Cohen et al4 Observational cohort study (n= 741 visitor
entries) in ICUs in 3 hospitals; duration and
level of contact recorded
Visitors spent more time in patient rooms than any other
group (mean 14 minutes per visit). Contact with either
patients or patient blood/body fluid occurred in 51.9% of
visitor encounters, and 28.5% had contact with the
environment. Only 33% of personal visitors wore gloves
when touching patients.
Glove use among visitors with contact with blood/body
fluids were 14/21 (66%) for patients on contact
precautions and 2/28 (7%) for patients not on contact
precautions.
2011 Fakhry et al.13 Quasi-experimental study using an electronic
motion sensor-triggered audible hand
hygiene reminder installed at hospital ward
entrances
Overall hand hygiene adherence increased from 7.6% to
49.9% (P< .001). The adherence of visitors and
nonclinical staff increased immediately from 10.6% to
63.7% and from 5.3% to 34.8%, respectively (P< .001).
2011 Gupta et al18 Survey of newborn hospitals for influenza virus
isolation during and after 2009 pandemic
(n= 111 during and n= 48 after)
Policies became less significantly stringent after the
pandemic. More facilities allowed direct breastfeeding and
direct contact with mother/infant and did not restrict
access to facility.
2001 Kellerman et al17 Direct observation of rooms containing
patients with tuberculosis (n= 30 patients)
In 134 visits, visitors left negative pressure room doors open
longer than HCWs, wore masks appropriately 55% of the
time, and wore approved masks only 59% of the time.
1998 Kellerman et al16 Survey of freestanding children’s hospitals
(n= 195)
Tuberculosis-specific policies varied and were not present in
all facilities. Most facilities restricted visitor access to rooms.
2007 Manian et al8 Observational cohort study (n= 2,110 persons:
1,504 HCWs and 606 non-HCWs visitors) at
a tertiary care teaching hospital
Compliance with gown use among visitors was low (65%)
though higher among visitors to patients in ICUs than in
general wards (OR, 10; 95% CI, 6.0–17.0). In the ICU,
gown use was highly predictive of glove use.
1999 Nishimura12 Observational study using a ceiling-mounted
video camera connected to a time-lapse
video cassette recorder
Hand hygiene compliance among visitors (94%) was
significantly higher than among HCWs (71%) (P< .001).
Hand washing compliance among HCWs before entering
the ICU was low.
1991 Pettinger et al10 Observational study (n= 42 visitors) at a
surgical intensive care unit
Compliance among all groups with strict isolation (65%) was
better than with wound/skin (40%) or excretion/secretion
(36%) isolation (P< .01). Visitors were more compliant
than HCWs (88% versus 41%; P< .01).
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contact precautions, believe that contact precautions improved
patient care and feel that contact precautions would not
impact the duration of time visitors spend with patients.5 In
this survey, approximately 50% of those surveyed supported
glove and gown use among visitors of patients on contact
precautions.
We identified 5 studies in which adherence with contact
isolation practices among hospital visitors was evaluated.6–10
Marked heterogeneity was observed among study populations
and settings though all included small numbers of visitors. All
studies were observational cohort studies using trained
observers to monitor adherence. Most studies included both
visitors and HCWs.6–10 A total of 4 studies assessed adherence
to different components of contact precautions including
hand hygiene and gown and glove use; 2 studies6,10 reported
adherence to contact precautions as a composite measure of all
components. Only 1 study focused specifically on MRSA6 and
revealed low rates of compliance with contact precautions
among visitors (11%). No studies focused on other multidrug-
resistant bacteria or on C. difficile. Visitor adherence compo-
nents of contact precautions, specifically the use of gowns and
gloves, varied among the studies. Adherence to gown use
procedures ranged from 49% to 65%.7–9 Another study
demonstrated that compliance with glove use and hand
hygiene procedures among visitors to patients on contact
precautions was lower than compliance with gown use.6
Compared with HCWs, adherence among visitors was gen-
erally lower, although 1 study of visitors to a surgical intensive
care unit (ICU) revealed that rates of adherence to all isolation
precautions (ie, secretion/excretion precautions, wound pre-
cautions, and strict isolation) were higher among visitors than
HCWs (88% vs 41%).10 Comparing different healthcare
settings, 1 study demonstrated that compliance with gown and
glove use among visitors was higher in the ICU setting than in
the adult and pediatric medical units.7
Visitors and Hand Hygiene
Visitor compliance with hand hygiene procedures has been
assessed in a few studies in different hospital locations. In
common areas of hospitals, visitor compliance with hand
hygiene procedures has been monitored in relation to inter-
ventions designed to make hand hygiene easier and to remind
visitors to perform hand hygiene. Placement of an alcohol
hand-rub dispenser and a sign reminding visitors to perform
hand hygiene in a hospital lobby increased the visitor hand
hygiene rate from <1% to 12%.11 Reminders to perform hand
hygiene placed at the entrance of an ICU increased visitor
compliance. In a Japanese ICU that also required visitors to
change shoes and don gowns, a sign and multiple hand hygiene
stations led to 94% compliance with hand hygiene among
visitors.12 In a more traditional ICU in England, the use of a
motion-sensed audio reminder increased the visitor hand
hygiene rate from 11% to 64%.13 A study in 2 English hospitals
compared visitor and HCW compliance with hand hygiene
related to patient care during standardized World Health
Organization (WHO) 5 Moments over 48 hours; visitor hand
hygiene compliance was no different than HCW compliance
(57% vs 56%).14 In a small sample of visitors to a US hospital,
visitor compliance with hand hygiene was approximately 10%
on room entry and exit.7 Notably, hand hygiene compliance
was much lower than visitor compliance with gown and glove
use for patients on contact precautions; compliance with
gowns and gloves was approximately 40–60%.7 A similar
frequency of visitor compliance with hand hygiene was the
primary reason for lack of compliance with contact precaution
table 1. Continued
Year Lead Author Methodology Findings
2010 Randle14 Observational study measured HCWs, patient
and visitor hand hygiene compliance in 2
hospital wards using the ‘5 moments of hand
hygiene’ observation tool
Among HCWs, compliance was 47% for doctors, 75% for
nurses, 78% for allied health professionals, and 59% for
ancillary and other staff (P< .001). There was no
difference in compliance between patients and visitors
(56% vs 57%, P= .87).
2014 Roidad et al5 Survey of visitors of patients in contact
isolation
Visitors understood the purpose of contact isolation and felt
that contact isolation improves care. Half of visitors
surveyed felt that visitors should be required to wear
gowns and gloves when visiting patients in contact
isolation.
2010 Tan et al15 Survey of attitudes toward influenza response
measures (n= 10 visitors)
Visitors found measures to be inconvenient.
2007 Weber et al9 Observational survey (n= 69 visitors) on
medical, pediatric and intensive care units
Visitor rates of compliance with the specific requirements of
contact isolation (ie, percentage of instances in which
visitors wore appropriate personal protective equipment)
were 49.3% for gowns and 37.1% for gloves.
NOTE. ICU, intensive care unit; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; HCWs, healthcare
workers; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence inteet alrval.
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in a Canadian hospital in which 10% overall visitor com-
pliance with contact precautions was observed.6 Notably, these
studies included minimal description of visitor instruction on
hand hygiene; therefore, the wide range of compliance might
be associated with variations in the education of visitors.
Visitors and Respiratory Isolation Precautions
Limited data are available in the literature regarding isolation
precautions for visitors of patients on respiratory isolation. No
data exist regarding the impact of visitor compliance with
respiratory isolation and subsequent infection linked to the
visit. A literature review identified 6 articles surveying various
aspects of visitors and respiratory precautions.15–20 All studies
were small and observational or cross-sectional by design. Of
these 6 studies, 3 consisted of surveys,15,16,18 1 study included
direct observation,17 and 2 studies described procedures dur-
ing outbreak settings.19,20 Of the 6 studies, 5 focused on
pediatric care.16–20 Most studies evaluated both visitor and
HCW compliance and perceptions with respect to isolation
procedures, each with relatively small sample sizes.
Tan et al15 surveyed 10 visitors during an influenza A H1N1
outbreak, with half of respondents indicating that the response
measures were an inconvenience. Gupta and Pursley18 sur-
veyed infection prevention practices in US neonatal hospital
units during and after the 2009 H1N1 influenza A pandemic.
They documented significant differences in the policies and
procedures used to prevent virus transmission after the pan-
demic. For example, after the pandemic, significantly fewer
facilities limited direct breastfeeding, separated mother and
newborn, and restricted children from various areas of the
facility. Christie et al19 described a response during a pertussis
outbreak and outlined a number of visitor procedures
enforced by staff. These visitor-related interventions included
(1) mandatory surgical masks for all visitors upon arrival to the
facility where testing was performed, (2) visitor restrictions for
children under 14 years of age, (3) restriction of neonatal ICU
visitation to parents, grandparents, and legal guardians, and
(4) complimentary temporary child care.19 Similarly, Beck
et al20 summarized interventions used to limit the spread of
SARS during the Toronto outbreak. One unique procedure
used was to offer incentives and rewards to children to wear
masks. In collaboration with the Association for Professionals
in Infection Control and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, these investigators surveyed multiple facilities
caring for pediatric patients with tuberculosis. Of the 195
responses, fewer than half indicated that they had a pediatric-
specific tuberculosis control policy. Respondents varied with
respect to documentation regarding when to discontinue
respiratory isolation. Approximately 70% of respondents
indicate that they restricted visitors to tuberculosis isolation
rooms, while >40% of respondents denied visitation privileges
until tuberculosis status was determined.16
Only 1 study directly measured visitor compliance with
respiratory isolation.16,17 This survey used direct observation
to study infection control procedures for pediatric patients
with tuberculosis. The investigators evaluated 134 visitors
(family members or friends). Visitors tended to leave the
negative pressure room door open longer than 30 seconds
more often than HCWs. Additionally, visitors only wore the
approved respirator in 41% of occasions, and in only 55% of
these instances were respirators worn correctly.17
Visitors and Transmission/Outbreaks
Visitors have been implicated in some nosocomial outbreaks,
and screening visitors and restriction of symptomatic visitors
may play an important a role in outbreak control. Some
notable examples include outbreaks of tuberculosis, norovirus,
and SARS.
Pediatric patients who have active tuberculosis typically
acquired the infection from a parent or other adult caregiver,21
prompting recommendations that caregivers of pediatric
tuberculosis patients be screened for active disease them-
selves.22 George et al23 described a large outbreak at a chil-
dren’s hospital traced to cavitary tuberculosis in a patient’s
mother. The investigation revealed that 24 pediatric patients
who had contact with the mother developed active TB, with an
especially high attack rate among immunosuppressed patients.
Weinstein et al24 described transmission from a visitor of a
pediatric patient to 2 hospital contacts who acquired latent
infection.
Because of the highly contagious nature of norovirus and its
tendency to cause epidemics in both community and health-
care settings, it is not straightforward to prove a role of visitors
in perpetuating nosocomial outbreaks; however, visitor restric-
tion is often part of the outbreak control strategy.25 Johnston et al
described a large norovirus outbreak affecting >500 hospital
patients and staff. Initially, visitors were screened for symptoms
and symptomatic visitors were restricted for 72 hours. When
transmission continued despite these measures, a restriction on
all visitation was imposed, with exceptions on a case-by-case
basis.26 A prospective, survey-based study of norovirus outbreaks
in 49 Dutch nursing homes showed that restricting symptomatic
visitors was the only outbreak control measure that, in multi-
variate analysis, significantly reduced the residents’ odds of
acquiring norovirus.27
As with norovirus, several papers speculate about the con-
tribution of visitors to nosocomial outbreaks of influenza and
other respiratory viruses, but few data are available to support
this hypothesis.28–35 Nevertheless, restriction of symptomatic
visitors or visitors who have had contact with contagious
patients has been a core strategy in outbreak control.24,34,36–40
The pivotal role of hospital visitors in spreading infection
was well documented in the epidemic of SARS in 2003–2004,
which was caused by a novel coronavirus that spread in Asia
and Canada. Overall, 8,096 cases of SARS and 774 deaths were
reported.21 As documented in several reports, hospital visitors
were part of the transmission cycle within hospitals and in the
community: visitors acquired the infection in healthcare
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facilities41 and subsequently became a source of transmission
to patients and HCWs themselves,42 their families, and the
community outside the hospital.43
A retrospective study identified at least 21 cases in Singapore
alone that resulted from transmission by hospital visitors to
family and community contacts.43 Once the role of visitors in
the epidemiology of SARS was appreciated, restrictions were
placed on hospital visitation, and recent visitors to wards
housing active SARS cases were quarantined. Retrospective
assessment of containment strategies at hospitals involved in
the epidemic identified incomplete restriction and tracking of
visitors (using a visitor log) as weaknesses of the containment
strategy that resulted in additional cases. Visitors initially were
allowed in the SARS wards with full personal protective
equipment, and later, when transmission continued, visitors
were disallowed. Similar restrictions on hospital visitors were
implemented as SARS control measures in other hospitals.44
During the quarantine of hospitals in Toronto and else-
where, visitors and staff were screened before entry into the
facility using questionnaires and thermometers, and visitors
whose results were suspicious for SARS were referred to the
emergency department.44 In some countries, infrared thermal
imaging was used to screen large numbers of patients and
visitors for elevated body temperature as an initial screen for
respiratory viral infection.
Summary of Survey Results
Between April and May 2014, we sent a survey to all SHEA
members and members of the SHEA Research Network to
assess their institutional policies (if any) and practices
regarding isolation precautions for visitors.
Of 1,520 SHEA members, 314 SHEA members and mem-
bers of the SHEA Research Network responded to the survey,
for a 21% response rate (Table 2). The majority of respondents
were from North America (United States and Canada) (89%).
Most worked at hospitals (91%); an additional 4% worked at
freestanding children’s hospitals; 1% worked at long-term care
facilities; and 0.3% worked at freestanding clinics. Of 168
respondents, 23% represented a pediatric facility. The majority
of responses were from either university/teaching hospitals
(40%) or university/teaching-affiliated hospitals (28%). We
received additional responses from nonteaching hospitals
(25%), Veterans Affairs hospitals (3%), and specialty hospitals
(1%). For hospitals, the mean number of licensed beds was
496. Most respondents were either infection preventionists
(50%) or hospital epidemiologists (39%).
Most respondents reported that their hospitals posted iso-
lation precautions signs on the doors of isolation rooms (99%)
(Table 3). Specific isolation signs were used by 98% of
respondents for airborne precautions (eg, tuberculosis), con-
tact precautions (eg, MRSA), and droplet precautions (eg,
pertussis). Well over half of the respondents had special signs
for immunocompromised protective precautions (eg, neu-
tropenic patients) (64%) and C. difficile infection (59%).
Fewer respondents reported using as sign for enteric precau-
tions (18%). The majority provided both written instructions
and pictures on their isolation signs (90%), whereas a small
proportion provided only written instructions (8%) or only
pictures (2%). Of 281 respondents who provided written
instructions, 63% included information only in English. Fewer
respondents included information in both English and Spanish
(32%), and a very small proportion provided information in
English, Spanish, and an additional language (5%). A higher
proportion of pediatric facilities than nonpediatric facilities
provided signs with information in both English and Spanish
(50% vs 29%), whereas a higher proportion of nonpediatric
facilities than pediatric facilities had information only in
English (65% vs 41%).
The majority of respondents reported having a policy for
visitors entering inpatient isolation rooms (83%) (Table 4). Of
these 286 respondents, 57% indicated that they had the same
requirements for isolation precautions for visitors as for
healthcare providers, whereas 42% indicated that they did not
and 1% indicated that they did not know. Of 211 responses
regarding visitors of patients on contact precautions, gowns
(96%) and gloves (94%) were most frequently required. A very
small proportion required surgical masks (6%), and 1
respondent required N95 respirators. Similarly, when asked
about rooms of patients with CRE and/or KPC-producing
bacteria, among 227 responses, gowns (97%) and gloves
(97%) were most frequently required. Surgical masks were
required by 9%, and 2 respondents (1%) required N95
respirators. Visitors entering airborne isolation rooms were
most commonly required to wear N95 respirators (68% of 267
responses), while 38% of facilities required surgical masks, and







Respondent role N= 275 N= 32 N= 307
Infection preventionist 52 34 50
Hospital epidemiologist 38 50 39
Facility characteristics
Type N= 266 N= 30 N= 296




Long-term care facility 1 0 1
Other 0 0 0
Affiliation N= 277 N= 32 N= 309




Non-teaching 26 22 25
VA 3 0 3
Specialty 0 3 1
Pediatric facility N= 150 N= 18 N= 168
Yes 23 22 23
NOTE. VA, Department of Veterans Affairs.
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10% required powered air-purifying respirators for respiratory
protection. A small proportion also required visitors to wear
gowns (13%) and gloves (11%). Regarding droplet isolation
rooms, surgical masks were most commonly required (97% of
260 responses), but several respondents also required gowns
(25%) and gloves (26%).
Most respondents did not monitor visitor compliance with
isolation precautions (77%) or hand hygiene (77%) (Table 5).
Several reported enforcing more intensive compliance by
visitors of patients with CRE (46%) and C. difficile (41%).
Among 239 respondents, visitor non-compliance with isola-
tion precautions was most commonly handled by nurse dis-
cussion with visitor (93%), followed by infection preventionist
discussion with visitor (55%), involvement of security team
(14%), and visitor exclusion (7%); additionally, 40% men-
tioned that this response varied depending on unit, shift, etc.
Education on hand hygiene was provided to visitors by
77% of respondents. Similarly, education about isolation pre-
cautions for visitors was provided through brochures or signs
by 74%, and/or in person by a physician or registered nurse by
50%. Written patient education brochures or signs for various
types of precautions and organisms were available as follows
(in descending order of frequency): contact precautions
(72%), MRSA and/or C. difficile (67%), airborne precautions
(63%), VRE (53%), CRE and/or KPC (34%), and immuno-
compromised protective precautions (30%).
Some differences were noted in visitor isolation precaution
requirements between healthcare facilities in and outside
North America. North American respondents were more likely
to report special isolation signs for C. difficile (62%) and
enteric precautions (18%) compared with those outside North
America (32%, and 10% respectively). Respondents outside
North America were more likely to enforce stricter precautions
for visitors of patients with CRE/KPC (61% vs 44% North
American respondents) but less likely to enforce stricter pre-
cautions for C. difficile (26% vs 43% North American
respondents). Masks for visitors of patients with CRE/KPC,
and gloves and gowns for visitors of patients in airborne
table 3. Isolation Precautions Signage and Education
North America (%) International (%) Total (%)
Education N= 245 N= 31 N= 276
Education measure
Brochures or signs 78 42 74
MD or RN 49 55 50
Education topic N= 241 N= 31 N= 272
MRSA 72 23 67
Clostridium difficile 71 29 67
VRE 56 32 53
CRE/KPC 34 35 34
Airborne precautions 63 58 63
Contact precautions 72 71 72
Immunocompromised patients 28 42 30
Hand hygiene education provided to visitors N= 244 N= 31 N= 275
Yes 77 77 77
Isolation signage
Signage posted on doors of isolation rooms N= 259 N= 31 N= 290
Yes 100 87 99
Types of isolation signs N= 260 N= 31 N= 291
Airborne 98 97 98
Contact 98 94 98
Droplet 98 94 98
Immunocompromised 64 58 64
C. difficile 62 32 59
Enteric 18 10 18
Instruction mode N= 258 N= 30 N= 288
Written instructions and pictures 91 80 90
Written instructions only 7 13 8
Pictures only 2 7 2
Language used in written signs N= 248 N= 8 N= 256
English only 63 50 63
English and Spanish 33 13 32
English, Spanish, and others 4 38 5
NOTE. MD, medical doctor; RN, registered nurse; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; KPC,Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase;
CRE, carbapenem-resistant enterobacteriaceae; VRE, vancomycin-resistant enterococci.
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precautions, were more commonly required by respondents
outside North America. Respondents outside North America
were also more likely to monitor visitor compliance with hand
hygiene (39% vs 19%) and with isolation precautions (31% vs
20%) compared with North American respondents. A higher
proportion of North American respondents provided educa-
tion about isolation precautions for visitors through brochures
and signs (78% vs 42% outside North America). Similarly,
fewer respondents outside North America provided written
patient education for specific pathogens (MRSA, VRE, and
C. difficile) compared with North American respondents.
discussion
Hospital visitors may play a significant role in the ecology of
healthcare-associated infections. Visitors have initiated or
been involved in nosocomial outbreaks23,24,41–43 and have an
unknown role in transmission of nosocomial bacteria within
the hospital environment. Most visitors do not visit>1 patient,
and therefore do not pose the risk of transmission of patho-
gens from room to room that can occur via HCWs or shared
patient care equipment. Thus, those visitors who do have
contact with multiple patients are recommended to use
personal protective equipment similar to that used by staff.
Epidemic situations mandate visitor restrictions, additional
precautions for visitors, or both.
Visitor adherence to infection control precautions seems, in
the few heterogeneous studies that report compliance, quite
variable.6–9 Evidence from several studies suggests that edu-
cational interventions encouraging visitor cooperation with
infection control precautions do improve adherence.11–13
Inspiring consistent hand hygiene by visitors remains a
table 4. Isolation Precaution Policies and Practices
North America (%) International (%) Total (%)
Hospital policies N= 256 N= 30 N= 286
Hospital has policy for visitors of patients in isolation
Yes 82 90 83
Requirements for visitors same as for HCWs? N= 200 N= 26 N= 226
Yes 43 38 42
Different policy for parents/ guardians/ partners? N= 249 N= 29 N= 278
Yes 12 21 13
PPE requirements by type of isolation precaution
Contact precautions N= 190 N= 21 N= 211
Gloves 96 81 94
Gown 96 90 96
Masks 5 14 6
N95 Respirator 0 5 0
Immunocompromised patients N= 80 N= 23 N= 103
Gloves 54 43 51
Gown 45 61 49
Masks 86 91 87
N95 Respirator 1 9 3
KPC/CRE patients N= 203 N= 24 N= 227
Gloves 99 88 97
Gown 98 92 97
Masks 8 21 9
N95 Respirator 0 4 1
Airborne precautions N= 238 N= 29 N= 267
Gloves 9 31 11
Gown 10 38 13
Masks 39 31 38
N95 Respirator 67 79 68
PAPR 11 0 10
Droplet precautions N= 231 N= 29 N= 260
Gloves 25 34 26
Gown 23 38 25
Masks 97 93 97
N95 Respirator 3 10 4
PAPR 0.4 0 0.4
NOTE. HCWs, healthcare workers; KPC, Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase; CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; PAPR, powered
air-purifying respirator.
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significant challenge (as does inspiring hand hygiene by
HCWs). In some cases, adherence with gowning and gloving
was better among visitors than among HCWs.10 Most hospi-
tals in North America have prioritized monitoring of com-
pliance among HCWs rather than among visitors; however,
measuring compliance is essential to determining the effect of
any intervention and to improving visitor compliance. Nearly
all hospitals represented in the survey have isolation signs
containing instructions for hand hygiene and the use of per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE), and most provide written
brochures covering infection control topics. However, in only
half of hospitals did visitors receive education on hand hygiene
from a physician or nurse; this personal source of guidance
may be more influential than written materials. Visitors are a
dynamic population within a healthcare facility, so education
of visitors must be an ongoing activity.
The screening of visitors for symptoms of infection is
another constant challenge, particularly because oversight of
potentially symptomatic visitors may not be systematic
throughout each facility. Such efforts should be made
throughout healthcare facilities, but with particular focus in
wards that house immunocompromised adult and pediatric
patients. An additional consideration should be the percep-
tion, and subsequent impact, of visitors not wearing contact
precautions gear on the compliance with isolation precautions
among HCWs; certainly, educational interventions is war-
ranted in these settings.
While transient visitors must comply with precautions just
for the duration of their visit, family members may serve as a
patient’s caretaker or advocate and may be at the bedside for
many hours, if not around the clock. Our recommendations
are intended to be practical and tailored for extended visitors.
Family members who have had extended household exposure
to the respiratory or airborne illness of their respective patient
are generally not required to wear masks or respirators. Those
without extensive exposure are recommended to wear masks
or, in the case of airborne infections, to avoid entry into the
patient room altogether. Fit testing of visitors for N95
respirators is beyond the capability of most infection control
departments and would be logistically difficult for most
hospitals to incorporate routinely; however, it could poten-
tially be done on a case-by-case basis.
There is a paucity of pediatric data to guide the use of iso-
lation precautions. Given the very limited scientific literature
on the subject, studies should be funded to evaluate the role of
visitors on the horizontal transmission of pathogens in
pediatric facilities, and tools should be developed to reduce the
potential negative psychosocial impact of visitor isolation
precautions on children and families. Additionally, it is
important in pediatrics to distinguish parents/guardian and
other household contacts from nonhousehold visitors in terms
of risk of previous exposure to the pediatric patient prior to
admission.
Until informative pediatric studies are performed, the
decision to use isolation precautions for visitors should be
balanced by the potential negative psychosocial impact on
children as well as the potential interference with bonding,
breastfeeding, delivery of family-centered care, and the prac-
ticality of enforcing isolation precautions on parents/guar-
dians/visitors. This consideration is especially relevant among
visitors who room-in with the patient. Additionally, how fre-
quently PPE should be changed for visitors that are spending
prolonged periods of time with patients is unknown. The risk
of parents/guardians/visitors as vectors for transmission may
be different in pediatric hospitals with all single rooms com-
pared to hospitals with open unit layouts.
For patients colonized or infected with MRSA or potentially
other multidrug resistant organisms that were present on
admission, employing isolation precautions for parents/guar-
dians/visitors may not be practical. Often these organisms are
as prevalent in the community as in the hospital setting,
making it unlikely that visitor isolation precautions are
table 5. Visitor Compliance with Isolation Precautions
North America (%) International (%) Total (%)
Visitor compliance monitoring
Compliance with isolation precautions monitored? N= 255 N= 29 N= 284
Yes 20 31 21
Compliance with hand hygiene monitored? N= 257 N= 31 N= 288
Yes 19 39 21
More intensive compliance enforced for certain pathogens? N= 240 N= 31 N= 271
Clostridium difficile 43 26 41
KPC/CRE 44 61 46
Procedure for handling noncompliant visitors N= 212 N= 26 N= 238
Discussion with nurse 93 62 89
Discussion with infection preventionist 53 27 50
Varies depending on unit, shift, etc. 37 35 37
Facility security involved 13 15 13
Visitor excluded from facility 17 12 17
NOTE. KPC, Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase; CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.
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cost-effective interventions. In many situations the parent/
guardian caring for the patient prior to admission is likely to
already be colonized with the multidrug-resistant organism. In
situations in which the pediatric patient has potentially
acquired a new transmissible infection after admission to the
hospital, protection of parent/guardian/visitor by the use of
isolation precautions may be considered. However, the risk of
infection for parents/guardians/visitors is probably low if they
perform good hand hygiene. The additional benefit of wearing
gowns and gloves in these scenarios is unclear, and requiring
continuous glove use may actually reduce hand hygiene fre-
quency. Family and visitors of patients under either droplet or
airborne precautions may consider using isolation precau-
tions. However, isolation precautions must be balanced against
the likelihood of the negative psychosocial impact and inter-
ference with bonding of mask wearing and the fact that most
parents/guardians/household members have already been
exposed to the child in the home setting prior to hospitaliza-
tion and may either be immune to the infectious agent, already
in the incubation period, or may represent the adult index case
(eg, TB or pertussis) to whom the patient was exposed.
In summary, this guidance paper provides practical
recommendations on the use of isolation precautions among
visitors to acute care settings. Although most data were
obtained from acute care facilities, extrapolation to the post-
acute care setting is possible. These recommendations should
be adapted to hospitals based on their specific situation, annual
risk assessment, regional epidemiology, and individual patient
needs, particularly among the pediatric population. We
strongly recommend further research on this subject to better
characterize the role of visitors on the horizontal transmission
of pathogens within healthcare facilities.
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